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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the advantages of investigat-
ing primate societies to build Multi-Agent Systems, and we
present our preliminary results in this context. We first give
an overview of primates’ social competences, then we draw
a parallel between the main problems found in the study of
primate societies (regarding their social organization) and
some of the most commonly encountered issues when de-
signing Multi-Agent Systems. We describe a model of so-
cial cognition and perception that we have experimented.
Its results show that some social concepts can be imple-
mented by attaching importance to the interactions between
the agents, instead of using a complicated individual-based
model. Finally, we discuss the main extensions we are work-
ing on and propose applications to Multi-Agent technology.
1 Introduction
Studying primates provides the biologists with good
clues to human evolution, clues which do not only concern
individual features such as bipedalism or cognitive abili-
ties: it also gives useful examples of complex social com-
petences and behaviours. Section 2 of this paper gives an
overview of these competences. In section 3, we show that
the study of primate societies is of high interest to us for
building Multi-Agent Systems, since there are very simi-
lar issues between these two fields. Then, we present in
section 4 a reactive model to simulate some primate social
competences; its results are discussed in section 5. Finally,
section 6 presents our future work and possible extensions
to other topics of Multi-Agent Systems.
2 Primate Social Competences
In this section, we give an overview of primate social
competences, increasing complexity from the recognition
of social relations among the group to deception against the
conspecifics.
2.1 “Proto-Concepts”
Primates live in groups and can recognize each other.
Since they remember the outcome of social interactions,
the social structure of the group is usually based on a strict
hierarchy, almost always linear (i.e. transitive), called the
dominance relation. The cognitive specificity of primates—
particularly monkeys and apes—resides on the one hand in
their ability to recognize social relations between their con-
specifics, and on the other hand in the absence of corre-
lation for the dominance relation with physical differences
between individuals. Moreover, primates don’t only fight to
maintain or modify the social structure: dominant individu-
als often use threat signals, to which their conspecifics must
respond with submission ones.
In fact, using slides-matching methods, Dasser [12, 13]
shows that monkeys know which of two individuals has the
highest rank, and that they can handle with the transitiv-
ity property of the dominance relation. The experiments of
Cheney and Seyfarth [9] among vervet monkeys (broadcast-
ing recorded infant calls to several mothers, for instance)
demonstrate not only that a mother can identify her off-
spring, but also that the other present mothers know who,
among them, is concerned, because they look at the mother
and observe her reactions. This kind of experiments leads
to assume that monkeys and apes use “proto-concepts”: a
very rough symbolic representation of social relations.
Furthermore, the social hierarchy does not (unlike most
mammals and the other animals) depend exclusively on
physical power. Social factors are more critical to access
to high ranks in the group: for instance, the rank of the
mother (the higher it is, the higher the rank of the offspring
will be). It has an influence on the behaviours: for ex-
ample, Boesch reports that high-rank mothers spend more
time bringing up their male offspring than their female one;
this discriminating behaviour increases the chances of hav-
ing a dominant offspring without wasting time (males’ rank
closely depends on the mother’s rank, contrary to females’
one). At the opposite, low-rank mothers favour their female
offspring, whose rank may raise later, unlike the males.
Another important component of the social structure is
the institution of affiliative links and alliance networks be-
tween individuals. Monkeys spend a lot of time in grooming
each other; however, partners are not randomly chosen: one
usually prefers either relatives or previous partners. The
probability that one would be solicited correlates with the
time he spent grooming the solicitor in the past. This ac-
tivity has a prophylactic advantage, but its major role is the
reinforcement of the social cohesion. It creates very strong
links between individuals, so that one will rescue his part-
ner when needed (according to Dunbar [21], gossiping in
human groups would play a very close role, with greater ef-
ficiency). Depending on the strength of these links and the
opening up of the choice of partners, there may be more or
less a clannish substructure in the group, with dominance
relations between clans.
2.2 Increasing Social Complexity
Going further in this overview, we must take a look at
other social phenomena, such as “power delusion”. Jane
Goodall reports the case of an ordinary chimpanzee who
had stolen an empty can from the zoologists; this brave deed
impressed the whole group, and the thief rapidly became the
dominant male, since he only needed to brandish his can to
submit his ennemies. Later, the zoologists took back the
can, but the thief kept his rank: he won a high social status
using deception, but once it has been done, the situation
remained stable.
The ability of forming coalitions during fights also al-
lows some monkeys and apes (mostly baboons, macaques,
gorillas and chimpanzees) to design complex political be-
haviours to come to power. De Waal [15] describes the al-
liances and betrayals between three chimpanzees. The suc-
cessful strategy is comparable with “tit for tat” (see [2]),
since the ally expects the winner to share power with him,
as a reward for his support. If not the case, he will wait for
an opportunity to revenge.
All the social tensions due to struggle for power could
be dangerous for the whole group, since they could lead to
perpetual fight. Fortunately, two mechanisms contribute to
reducing them: redirecting aggressivity on an unprotected
individual, and peacemaking with the loser [16]. By this
way, the social structure remains viable.
2.3 Tactical Deception and “Machiavellian Intel-
ligence”
More recent observations assume that a few species
among primates (especially baboons, macaques and the
African great apes) have an ability for tactical deception.
A lot of anecdotes have been collected by zoologists and
compiled (see for instance [6, 7, 4]). First, let us consider
an example:
“The juvenile, named Paul, came across an adult fe-
male, Mel, just finishing the laborious process of digging
up a corm. There were major sources of nutrition at that
very dry, cold time of year, but difficult to obtain from the
hard ground; Paul was probably unable to dig his own. He
looked round, seeing no other baboon, and screamed loudly.
His mother, who was higher ranking than Mel, ran into view
grunting aggressively and immediately pursued Mel. When
they had both left the immediate area, Paul ate the corm.”
(Byrne [4])
Byrne and Whiten give the following definition for this
kind of social rigging:
“Our definition of tactical deception was a functional
one: ‘acts from the normal repertoire of the agent, deployed
such that another individual is likely to misinterpret what
the acts signify, to the advantage of the agent’.” [4]
Attempting to explain these surprising observations,
which might involve intentionality, Byrne and Whiten pro-
pose what they call the “machiavellian intelligence” hy-
pothesis: intelligence among primates might have evolved
under social pressure. Predation leads the individuals to
gather and form groups, but it also implies crowding, ten-
sions and sometimes violence. The “best” strategy in this
case would be to learn how to deceive the conspecifics and
get maximal selfish benefits from the social structure with-
out harming it or being unmasked by the group. This prob-
lematics is very similar to the iterated “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
when played in an ecological simulation, and to the search
of “evolutionarily stable strategies” (see [14, 2]).
In support of this, Dunbar [20] shows that the neocor-
tical ratio correlates with group size among most primate
species, indicating that competences in social information
processing are critical to maintain group cohesion.
Other theories consider that primate intelligence does not
especially emerge from social competences, and of course
it is out of purpose to take a decision in that domain. But,
to our point of view, it seems that the machiavellian intel-
ligence hypothesis better addresses the problem of which
mechanisms allow to build a social organization from in-
terindividual interactions, which typically is very close to
DAI issues.
3 From Primates to Agents: Problem-
Solving among Primates
In this section, we outlight some features that make pri-
mate societies simulation of high interest for Multi-Agent
Systems.
3.1 Primate Societies and Multi-Agent Systems
We assume that the study of primate societies illustrates
very well the difficulties to design Multi-Agent Systems.
Here are the three main stages of our approach, which
strongly links primate studies to Multi-Agent design.
First, simulating primate societies to help biologists test-
ing their hypotheses would be a natural application of DAI,
since the problem involves by itself a group of agents.
The second important step has to deal with the granu-
larity of the agents and their complexity: since primate so-
cial competences seem to be very close to ours, we would
be led to consider them as a result of high-level cognitive
processes—which may be the case, of course—and to build
a high-level model. For instance, Byrne [5] proposes a
formal notation to describe tactical deception behaviours,
based on production rules and symbolic description of do-
main events: it could be very useful to biologists, but not
necessarily to us. In the same way, Worden [28] offers a
script-based symbolic learning theory for social behaviours,
but says nothing about how the agents build these represen-
tations (he only assumes that they have a special cognitive
module to do it).
According to Occam’s Razor, we prefer, as far as possi-
ble, to start with very simple agents, attaching importance
to their interactions (instead of their internal structure), to
produce complex collective behaviours. We should not in-
crease their individual complexity until such a model proves
incomplete.
Third, the mechanisms that will be used for those simula-
tions may be generalized in order to design Multi-Agent en-
gineering principles, or to show that some “reactive” princi-
ples (such as stimulus/response based behaviours) are use-
ful in complex social problems.
So, we have to define a radically distributed social
model, validate it through simulation, and finally specify
general mechanisms for social organization. We try to for-
mulate primate social competences in terms of Multi-Agent
Systems, and consequently, we can raise the following is-
sues:
 Proto-concepts
We have to find a social cognition model that can re-
produce the apparently symbolic and logical represen-
tations of monkeys. Should we first consider a com-
plicated symbolic model for rank learning, or should
we better find a way to reduce the proto-concepts to a
lower complexity level, letting them emerge from in-
teractions between the agents?
 Coalitions
This organization level is quite important regarding
Multi-Agent Systems, since it is the basis for team
work. Moreover, it could be designed with some
mechanisms similar to proto-concepts, if we consider
that there are relational proto-concepts (dominance,
affiliation, kinship for instance) and organizational
ones, concerning coalitions and alliances, which could
emerge from the latter.
 Tactical Deception
It may be necessary to consider some kind of learning
or planning. According to biologists, such behaviours
cannot be learned by trial-and-error, since they are suc-
cessful at the first time. They can result either from a
progressive evolution (which would have built innate
behaviour rules) or from the use of a theory of mind.
At the present time, we do not want to pronounce on
the minimal cognition model that could produce these
behaviours. We believe that the study of the above so-
cial phenomena must help us to better specify such a
model.
3.2 An Illustrative Example: the Simulation of
Hunting
We began to work on the simulation of collective red
colobus hunting among wild chimpanzees. Boesch de-
scribes this activity in [3] and we think that it raises great
interest regarding the previous discussed issues.
Nishida [25] also reported hunting behaviours among
chimpanzees, but the preys were almost juvenile colobus
monkeys, and the behaviour itself, involving a few indi-
viduals, seems to be very opportunistic. At the opposite,
where Boesch made his observations, the predatory be-
haviour is more interesting, to our point of view: almost the
whole group takes part in hunting adult red colobus mon-
keys (which provide more meat, but are of course more dif-
ficult to catch and kill). In fact, when we analyze the course
of the operations, we found that chimpanzees have to deal
with some typical Multi-Agent issues:
 Task differentiation: the hunting process begins when
the group follows an initiator (often an old chim-
panzee), without any other sign. Then, everybody has
a role to play: some climb very silently the trees (red
colobus monkeys live at the top), some anticipate both
colobus and chimpanzee moves to be ready to climb
up very quickly and drive the colobus monkeys in the
right direction, others run after the preys, others am-
bush them and catch them.
 Prey surrounding: the chimpanzees must prevent their
preys from escaping, since colobus monkeys, which
are smaller than chimpanzees, can easily jump from
one tree to another, unlike their predators. It involves
on the one hand a very intensive and accurate antici-
pation of group moves, and on the other hand a global
coordination of the whole attacking group.
 Collective learning: from a hunting session to the next
one, the distribution of the roles among the group can
evolve, depending on individual competences. The
problem is not really to know how each chimpanzee
learns a particular role, but how the community suc-
cessfully distributes them, taking the evolution of indi-
vidual performances into account.
 Individual strategies: the global organization during
hunting may be a compromise between a collective
goal (maximizing the efficiency of the session) and an
individual motivation. For instance, food attribution
after the hunting does not depend on social structure
(unlike in opportunistic hunting), but on the hunting
roles (the catcher gets the maximum). Indeed, some
roles are more interesting than others, but to com-
plete hunting, a good repartition must occur, and it
does, in fact, without apparent concertation. More-
over, Boesch notices that opportunistic behaviours can
be found. There is a visible correlation between num-
ber of hunters, success rate, and collaboration; but,
the more hunters there are, the more difficult it is to
evaluate individual contribution. For this reason, “by-
standers” (individuals who were present during the
hunting but did nothing) or “latecomer” (who arrived
after the capture) may usurp a part of the booty. For a
chimpanzee, there is a dilemma between honestly tak-
ing part to the hunting and trying to cheat.
All these features make the simulation of hunting an
highly challenging application to test parsimony hypothe-
ses regarding social cognition models. More generally, we
believe that the study of social cognition and organization
should provide powerful models for designing Multi-Agent
Systems. In the following section, we report the firsts re-
sults of such an approach.
4 A Reactive Model to Simulate Social Con-
cepts
This section gives an illustration of our approach to the
simulation of social competences, which begins with the
study of “proto-concepts” (see x 2.1). We first present
the analysis method we use to describe social interactions.
Next, we give a “reactive” model of social cognition. Our
work uses a simulation platform called MACACA (see [24]),
which concerns the social structure of various macaque so-
cieties.
We have kept many features of this platform, such as
the simulation framework (based on the same principles
than Drogoul’s EthoModelling Framework [19]), in which
the behaviours of the agents, called tasks, are fixed action
patterns, with preconditions. Our preconditions are mostly
probabilistic, as well as the issue of the behaviours (for in-
stance, the probability that an agent triggers a fight depends
on his motivation in fight, which is an internal stimulus; in
the same way, the likelihood of winning depends on the op-
ponents’ strength and previous victories).
But, in MACACA, social knowledge is implemented in
each agent using a memory of the interactions with the con-
specifics: for instance, the outcomes of the conflicts give an
indication of dominance relations between an agent and the
others. This social information is learned through reinforce-
ment (positive feedback). We believe that this model does
not attach enough importance to the interactions between
the agents.
4.1 A Critical Distinction between Organization
Levels
When trying to analyze complex social behaviours such
as those found in primate societies, it is very difficult to
build a low-level cognition model, since going beyond the
simple description of individual behaviours or interactions
seems inextricable.
For this reason, we used the Cassiopeia Method (see [11]
or [10]) to reduce the complexity of the study. According to
its hypotheses, designing Multi-Agent Systems should in-
volve three organization levels: a domain-dependent level,
a relational level, and an organizational level.
The agents simultaneously play roles in the three levels.
In the context of primate societies, domain-dependent roles
concern the physical instantiation of the behaviours (such
as Threat, Submit, Eat...); relational roles have to deal
with interindividual interactions (like affiliation, dominance
or kinship), and organizational roles are involved in coali-
tions and alliances. Triangular relations (studied for in-
stance by Kummer [23]) between a protector, his “prote´ge´”
and an aggressor among many primate societies are in a
way very close to this kind of analysis: given these three
relational roles, it is easy to draw functional dependencies
between them (in terms of affiliation, antagonisms or dom-
inance) leading to the emergence of coalition behaviours.
However, we preferred to focus on determining which
cognitive features would be necessary to reproduce proto-
concepts in a Multi-Agent simulation, before examining
more complex phenomena.
4.2 Social Cognition: the Pheromone Model
We assume that social knowledge (i.e. both relational
and organizational knowledges) should be processed in a
distributed way, rather than by using individual-based rep-
resentations. In the MACACA model, everybody knows per-
fectly his strength relatively to his conspecifics, but nothing
about the dominance relation between two of them. More-
over, the positive feedback that builds this social representa-
tion concerns only interindividual situations (and not really
social ones), so far as the outcome of a relation between two
individuals has no effect on their global representations of
their conspecifics and cannot be perceived by other individ-
uals.
Another problem occurs when adding a new agent in the
population. His social representations have to be built by
interacting many times with the others. In natural societies,
we might assume that some clues (shiny hair, spatial repar-
tition of agents...), in addition to observation, help the new-
comer to build quickly his representations.
Insects lay down or diffuse molecules in the environ-
ment to share information about “domain-dependent prob-
lems” (such as foraging, nest building, eggs care), and Dro-
goul [18, 17] shows how such mechanisms can be used in
problem-solving. The model we propose uses the environ-
ment as a social medium, defining “social pheromones” as
follows (using the terms defined by the Cassiopeia method-
ology):
A given social interaction is linked with a particular kind
of stimulus, called “social pheromone”, which is emitted
in the environment; this stimulus, when perceived by an
agent, causes a modification in his relational and/or orga-
nizational behaviours or knowledges.
By this way, we ensure independence between Cas-
siopeia levels, and consequently the program modularity.
The purpose of this model is to reproduce the proto-
concept phenomena; let us now develop how to use it in the
case of the dominance relation. In this context, each agent
diffuses a social pheromone (called “rank” for instance),
and, instead of memorizing fight outcomes, he maintains
sensitivity thresholds to his conspecifics’ stimuli (see fig-
ure 1). We ensure a direct feedback between the threshold
set and the intensity of the emitted stimulus by computing
it through the following:
rank
i
=
1
N   1
X
j 6=i
T
i
(j)
 rank
i
: intensity of the dominance stimulus for agent
i;
 N : size of the population;
 T
i
(j) : sensitivity threshold of agent i towards domi-
nance stimuli of agent j.
Sensitivity
thresholds
rank
a3 a4 a5 a6a1 a2 Agents
Figure 1. This graph illustrates an agent’s so-
cial representations of his conspecifics (ab-
scissa). Each agent maintains a set of sen-
sitivity thresholds to determine wether or not
he dominates his conspecifics. The average
of these thresholds gives the intensity of the
agent’s own dominance pheromone (called
“rank”).
When an agent perceives a dominance stimulus, he com-
pares its intensity to the threshold allocated to its emitter,
and the result determines the agent’s relational behaviour: if
the stimulus is low enough, then the agent acts as he would
dominate the pheromone’s emitter. Therefore, the higher
an agent’s thresholds are, the less the agent responds to his
conspecifics’ stimuli; at the same time, his own stimulus has
a strong intensity, and probably a great impact on the other
agents.
When a domain-dependent role has an influence on re-
lational roles, the thresholds are being adjusted according
to the outcome of the interactions. For instance, when
a fight occurs, the winner (W ) and the loser (L) modify
their respective thresholds (see figure 2 and 3): T
W
(L)
increases while T
L
(W ) decreases. The amplitude of the
correction is proportional to the former threshold for the
loser, and inversely proportional to it for the winner (ac-
cording to a model proposed in [22]). Therefore, the out-
comes of interindividual interactions have an additional in-
fluence on the intensity of the winner’s and the loser’s emit-
ted pheromone, so that their conspecifics may be sensitive
to it. That is why this model is a social representation (un-
like the former model, which disabled communication), but
however distributed (since no individual representation is
the mirror of the whole social structure, but the interaction
between them makes it emerge).
It is to notice that relational roles can influence each
other: for instance, when a female often grooms a dominant
male, her rank usually increases. In our model, it means that
an affiliative interaction with a high rank-stimulus emitter
would lead to increase the partner’s dominance thresholds
to other individuals, except for this high-rank individual.
Sensitivity
thresholds
rank
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
Agents
(1)
(2)
Figure 2. According to the outcome of a fight,
the threshold values change. The amplitude
of the correction correlates with the former
threshold. In the first case (1), the agent has
won against a low-rank conspecific (a2), so
the habituation to a2’s dominance stimulus is
low. In the second case (2), the agent has won
against a high-rank agent (a6), so the correc-
tion (knowledge revision) is quite important.
Sensitivity
thresholds
rank
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 Agents
(1)
(2)
Figure 3. In addition to figure 2, we show here
how the thresholds must be corrected when
the agents loses against: (1) a low-rank con-
specific (a2); (2) a high-rank conspecific (a6).
Finally, we needed to define a perception model to com-
plete our information-sharing one.
4.3 Simulating the Attention
According to our pheromone-like model, the percep-
tion process uses some of the characteristics that make
pheromones powerful:
 They are very simple information bits.
 They are limited in time (they evaporate); therefore,
obsolete information is discarded.
 They are limited in space (by diffusion); consequently,
the intensity of the stimulus, depending on the distance
between the source and the signal, takes part to the
meaning of the message.
The first point imposes that the “social pheromone” com-
puter object must be as simple as possible, rather than an
intricate negotiation protocol. In fact, a social pheromone is
a structure composed with the nature of the relational cat-
egory (dominance, kinship, affiliation...), the name of the
emitter, and the initial intensity. The second point is auto-
matically implemented, since pheromones are being emit-
ted and updated all the time.
For the third point, we defined a relational distance
based on the notion of mutual attention, since it seems that,
within a well-chosen range, monkeys’ social perceptions
don’t depend on the physical distance. Figure 4 shows two
agents with a physical orientation (which is in fact used to
move the agents). The angle between the agents and their
relative position to each other determine a mutual attention
factor. When the agents are face to face, the social distance
is minimal, and the mutual attention factor maximal. It is
the opposite when they are back to back.
By this way, we assume that our model is coherent
with the main characteristics of pheromonal communica-
tion. The simulation results we have obtained confirm the
validity of this model for proto-concept reproduction.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Definitions
The simulations ran using small populations of agents
(from 5 to 30); each simulation took around 40,000 steps
(a typical task takes from one to five steps). We measured
the evolution of the agents’ social representations and a few
significative magnitudes (calculated using the frequency of
each agent’s behaviours), among them:
Oi
Oj
Agent   i
Agent   j
Figure 4. Mutual attention: the two agents i
and j have orientation vectors; the angle be-
tween these two vectors is used to calculate
a mutual attention factor, which represents a
“social distance”.
 the linearity of the hierarchy, which reflects the struc-
ture of the society: close to 1, the global dominance
relation is strictly transitive (no triangles); be care-
ful that to this point of view, an agent dominates one
of his conspecifics when he wins more fights against
him than vice versa—this has nothing to see with the
“dominance feeling” of an agent using our perception
model. We will call the first case objective dominance,
and the other subjective dominance. The objective
dominance is a statistical and a posteriori magnitude,
while the subjective dominance is a relational response
to a stimulus, at a certain point.
 the linearity of the submissions, which indicates
wether or not the submission behaviours are used in
accordance with the objective dominance. In fact, the
agents act using their social knowledge (via task pre-
conditions), so this magnitude gives an estimation of
the correlation between subjective and objective dom-
inance.
5.2 Results and Interpretation
Using MACACA agents, those two magnitudes usually
increase in an exponential way, leading to a strict hierarchy,
almost linear, because of an excessive positive feedback ef-
fect. At the same time, global aggressivity decreases and
affiliation behaviours occur more and more frequently.
With our model, we can observe the cyclic succession
of two phases: at the beginning, the two above magnitudes
increase exponentially, then they suddenly collapse, before
increasing again, and so on. In fact, examining this phe-
nomenon with more details, it has been found that the lin-
earity of the submissions always collapses before the linear-
ity of the hierarchy; then, the number of threat behaviours
increases to the detriment of affiliative behaviours; finally,
more fights occur and the submissions behaviours decrease.
We propose to explain these obervations like follows:
imagine two agents with a similar physical power. Their
rank stimulus will certainly be quite the same, since they
are able to overcome the same conspecifics. But, due to
positive feedback, one (called A) may dominate the other
(B). Next, if agent B, leaving A, confronts lower-ranking
conspecifics, he will win most of the time, and the inten-
sity of his rank stimulus will grow up. When he encounters
A again, its intensity may be enough to trigger a response;
at the same time, T
B
(A) remained stable, though B’s rank
increased. In this situation, each agent’s social beliefs (de-
fined as the social behaviour triggered by the perception of
a social pheromone) are “erroneous”, since they do not cor-
relate with the outcomes of previous conflicts (that explains
why the linearity of the submissions collapses first). If a
fight occurs, B may win it (in accordance to his rank re-
inforcement), and both agents will correct their sensitivity
thresholds.
In fact, two concepts are modelled: “prejudice” (under
the meaning of “erroneous social beliefs” due to unsuffi-
cient updating), and “self-confidence” (a positive feedback
that does not act directly on the outcome of conflicts but on
relational knowledge).
As for proto-concepts, observing the evolution of in-
dividual representations leads to the conclusion that the
agents act mostly as if they would recognize dominance re-
lations between their conspecifics. Moreover, a new agent
can quickly adapt his behaviour to submit himself to the
dominant individuals, aggressing at the beginning mostly
the weakest ones. Another experiment consists in artifi-
cially modifying an agent’s threshold; this allows to sim-
ulate power delusion effects. In this situation, the doped
agent keeps the leadership until another one succeeds in
overcoming him.
These results seem to confirm our hypotheses regarding
the distinction of organization levels and the relevance of a
pheromone-like model to process relational information. In
the next section, we will describe some foreseen extensions
to this work and possible applications of primate societies
simulations to other domains.
6 Future Work
We have to extend our work through three directions:
first, our social cognition model is to be experimented more
widely on other relational roles. Yet we have mostly im-
plemented it for the dominance, affiliative and kinship re-
lations, but these two latter topics have not been enough
studied. Moreover, simulating hunting among wild chim-
panzees could provide new relational and organizational
roles. In addition, we assume that organizational roles could
be implemented through a similar pheromone-based model
(the difficulty would be to define a useful “organizational
distance”); this hypothesis is to be confirmed. However, our
“mutual attention”-based distance can be extended through
the attention towards a common target or goal.
The second point would be to abstract some of our simu-
lation mechanisms to complete the Cassiopeia methodolog-
ical framework, and to propose some engineering princi-
ples which could be implemented into other Multi-Agent
Systems. Parunak [26] summarizes studies of natural com-
plex systems, and explains how complex problems should
be formulated in terms of a collectivity of simple interact-
ing agents. His examples repose on path planning, brood
sorting (among ants), nest building (termites), task differen-
tiation (wasps), flocking (birds and fish) and prey surround-
ing (wolves). Furthermore, primate societies simulation
could provide Multi-Agents tools for relational and orga-
nizational issues: social structure building, team work, col-
lective strategies designing, etc. Castelfranchi also points
out (in the call for papers of the “Interdisciplinary Work-
shop on Trust and Deception”) the importance of building
a general theory of Trust and Deception for Multi-Agent
Systems, in order to prevent fraud when individual interests
have to compromise with collective goals.
Finally, social phenomena simulation raises stakes that
go far beyond biology. In fact, complex behaviours, such
as tactical deception, could interest economical or political
simulations, since primate behaviours are very close to hu-
man ones in this very domain. The simulation of primate so-
cial behaviours not only allows to test biological hypotheses
and understand collective behaviours, but also has repercus-
sions on other fields in social sciences.
7 Acknowledgments
This research is supported by a grant from the French
Department of Higher Education and Research.
References
[1] S. A. Altmann, editor. Social communication among pri-
mates. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.
[2] R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton. The evolution of coopera-
tion. Science, (211):1390–1396, 1981.
[3] C. Boesch and H. Boesch. Hunting behaviour of wild chim-
panzees in the Taı¨ National Park. American Journal of Phys-
ical Anthropology, (78):547–73, 1989.
[4] R. Byrne. The Thinking Ape : Evolutionary Origins of In-
telligence. Oxford University Press, 1995.
[5] R. W. Byrne. A formal notation to aid analysis of complex
behaviour: Understanding the tactical deception of primates.
Behaviour, (127 (3–4)):231–246, 1993.
[6] R. W. Byrne and A. Whiten. Machiavellian Intelligence:
social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys,
apes and humans. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
[7] R. W. Byrne and A. Whiten. Tactical deception in primates.
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, (11):233–273, 1988.
[8] C. Castelfranchi and J.-P. Mu¨ller, editors. From reaction to
cognition, Berlin-Heidelberg, 1995. Springer Verlag, Lec-
ture notes in AI 957.
[9] D. L. Cheney and R. M. Seyfarth. Vocal recognition in free-
ranging vervet monkeys. Animal Behavior, (30):362–367,
1980.
[10] A. Collinot and A. Drogoul. Using the cassiopeia Method
to Design a Soccer Robot Team. Applied Artificial Intelli-
gence. An International Journal, 1997.
[11] A. Collinot, A. Drogoul, and P. Benhamou. Agent-Oriented
Design of a Soccer Robot Team. In Tokoro [27].
[12] V. Dasser. A Social Concept of Monkeys. The`se inaugurale,
Universite´ de Zu¨rich, 1987.
[13] V. Dasser. A social concept in Java monkeys. Animal Be-
havior, (36):225–230, 1988.
[14] R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press,
second edition, 1989.
[15] F. B. de Waal. Chimpanzee Politics: power & sex among
apes. Harper & Row, London, 1982.
[16] F. B. de Waal. Peacemaking among Primates. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.
[17] A. Drogoul. When ants play chess (or can strategies emerge
from tactical behaviors?). In Castelfranchi and Mu¨ller [8],
pages 13–27.
[18] A. Drogoul and C. Dubreuil. A Distributed Approach to
N-Puzzle Solving. Proceedings of the Distributed Artificial
Intelligence Workshop, 1993.
[19] A. Drogoul and J. Ferber. Multi-Agent Simulation as a Tool
for Modeling Societies: Application to Social Differentia-
tion in Ant Colonies. Proceedings of the MAAMAW Work-
shop, 1992.
[20] R. I. Dunbar. Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in
primates. Journal of Human Evolution, (20):469–493, 1992.
[21] R. I. Dunbar. Grooming, gossiping and the origins of lan-
guage. Faber & Faber, London, 1996.
[22] P. Hogeweg and B. Hesper. The Ontogeny of the Interaction
Structure in Bumble Bee Colonies: a MIRROR Model. Be-
havioural Ecology and Sociobiology, (12):271–283, 1983.
[23] H. Kummer. Tripartite relations in hamadryas baboons. In
Altmann [1], 1967.
[24] S. Lalande, A. Drogoul, and B. Thierry. MACACA: a Multi-
Agent Computer simulation of Animal Communities based
on Alliances. Proceedings of Simulating Societies Sympo-
sium, 1995.
[25] T. Nishida, S. Uehara, and R. Nyundo. Predatory behaviour
among wild chimpanzees of the Mahale Mountains. Pri-
mates, (20):1–20, 1979.
[26] H. V. D. Parunak. “Go to the Ant”: Engineering Principles
from Natural Multi-Agent Systems. Annals of Operations
Research, 1997.
[27] M. Tokoro, editor. Proceedings of the Second International
Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, Menlo Park, Califor-
nia, 1996. AAAI Press.
[28] R. P. Worden. Primate Social Intelligence. Cognitive Sci-
ence, (20):579–616, 1996.
